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Abstract: In this article I dispute the claim, made by several contemporary
scholars, that Spinoza was a naturalist. ‘Naturalism’ here refers to two distinct
but related positions in contemporary philosophy. The first, ontological natu-
ralism, is the view that everything that exists possesses a certain character
(variously defined) permitting it to be defined as natural and prohibiting it
from being defined as supernatural. I argue that the only definition of onto-
logical naturalism that could be legitimately applied to Spinoza’s philosophy is
so unrestrictive as to tell us nothing about the content of his ideas. The second,
methodological naturalism, is the view that the natural sciences are the best
means of finding out substantial truths about the concrete world. I present
some historical research showing that Spinoza’s way of positioning himself
with respect to other philosophers in the Dutch Republic casts very serious
doubt on the claim that he was a methodological naturalist. This adds further
weight to arguments that have already been made against the naturalist
reading of Spinoza.
Introduction
One thing that is often said of Spinoza is that he was a naturalist.1 This
claim is important in the context of contemporary analytic philosophy,
where naturalism is something of an industry standard. Jack Ritchie
suggests that:
. . . if you were to ask a contemporary philosopher in the English-speaking world – one of the
living and thus not so great – to classify her philosophical position, I would wager that the
most common answer would be: ‘I’m a naturalist’.2
The suggestion that Spinoza was a naturalist therefore suggests that he
held something close to the outlook of a contemporary analytic philoso-
pher – a great philosopher, someone like Ritchie might say, who thought
like today’s not so great ones.3 I would like here to examine this suggestion
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and then repudiate it. I shall first explore what it means to claim that
Spinoza was a naturalist, in the various senses in which contemporary
analytic philosophers use that term. I shall then show how taking Spinoza
as a naturalist in any of those senses fails as a useful characterization of his
philosophy, especially when we examine it in its historical context.
More specifically, I shall argue that Spinoza is neither an ‘ontological’
nor a ‘methodological’ naturalist. The former kind of naturalist is,
roughly, one who believes that the only existing entities are those currently
recognized by the natural sciences, with allowances made for the possibil-
ity of unforeseen scientific advances. Spinoza’s philosophy, I shall argue, is
deeply committed to the existence of some entities that are recognized
neither by contemporary natural science nor by the natural science of
Spinoza’s day (insofar as there was such a thing). A methodological natu-
ralist is one who believes that the methodology common and special to the
natural sciences is the only one appropriate for discovering substantial
truths about the concrete world. It is highly doubtful that there is a single
method or even family of methods precisely fitting this profile. Neverthe-
less, I shall argue, one may characterize the common and special method-
ology of the natural sciences as ‘empiricism’, provided the latter is defined
with sufficient breadth. There is considerable scholarly debate concerning
the degree to which Spinoza was an empiricist. I aim to advance this
debate by placing Spinoza’s work in its historical context, an exercise that
highlights its distinctly non- and even anti-empiricist elements.
Ontological naturalism
Who are the contemporary naturalists, and what do they believe? Defining
naturalism is more difficult than applying the label in a generally accepted
fashion.4 It is usually said that there are two distinct kinds of naturalism.
One involves a certain kind of methodological commitment to natural
science as the best or only way to learn about the natural world. The other
involves an ontological thesis, to the effect that there are no supernatural
entities. When one comes to define ‘supernatural’, however, it is tempting
to place in the realm of the supernatural everything that is beyond detec-
tion by the methods of natural science. But in that case committing to
ontological naturalism seems to require a rejection of the methodological
variety. If the realm of the supernatural is, by definition, populated
entirely by things inaccessible to scientific knowledge, then the limitation
of all knowledge to the scientific variety rules out our knowing what, if
anything, resides in that domain. In confidently asserting that nothing
resides there, ontological naturalism makes an implicit claim to the pro-
hibited knowledge. Since ontological naturalism appears thus the more
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forthright of the two species, I shall begin by assessing the claim that
Spinoza was an ontological naturalist.
One version of ontological naturalism identifies itself, or at least regards
it as overlapping considerably, with physicalism. Mario de Caro and
David Macarthur note that ‘[i]n the recent past . . . the terms “naturalism”
and “physicalism” have often been used interchangeably’.5 Unfortunately,
‘physicalism’ is not much easier to define than ‘naturalism’. As a working
approximation, De Caro and Macarthur use David Armstrong’s defini-
tion: physicalism is the view ‘that the world contains nothing but the
entities recognised by physics [i.e., physical entities]’.6
We might allow that what Spinoza regarded as things conceived under
the attribute of extension should count as physical on this definition.
Cartesian physics suggested that extension and physicality amount to
much the same thing and studied physical things as essentially extended
things.7 Since Spinoza believed that the whole of nature could be con-
ceived under the attribute of extension,8 we might conclude that he
believed it to be, in its entirety, the kind of entity recognised by Cartesian
physics. But this might not be enough to qualify Spinoza as a physicalist,
since for him, nature also could also be conceived under the attribute
of thought, through which it appears distinctly non-physical on
Armstrong’s definition.9
Some scholars, however, have argued that, despite apparent objections
arising from the attribute of thought, the proper reading of the Ethics in
fact reveals a physicalist vision of reality. Edwin Curley, for example,
argues that since Spinoza claimed that each mode of thought is identical
with some mode of extension he in fact held the view that everything in the
world is physical, including mental states, which are ultimately reducible
to bodies or bodily affections.10 Curley is presumably interpreting Spinoza
as a physicalist along the lines of the view espoused by identity theorists
such as U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart.11 Michael Della Rocca, however,
denies that Spinoza should be read as a physicalist of this kind. He stresses
that, unlike modern identity theorists, Spinoza did not believe that ‘the
mental properties of a thing are to be completely explained by and depend
on its physical properties which are in some sense more fundamental’.12
On the other hand, some recent philosophers have argued that physi-
calism is compatible with the view that certain concepts referring to mental
properties are in no way explicable by or derivable from concepts of
physical properties.13 Therefore, there remains an open question about
whether Spinoza’s comments about the attribute of thought rule out any
reading that takes him to be a physicalist.
But there is a further objection to the physicalist reading of Spinoza.
Physics is not often said to recognise the existence of God’s infinite and
eternal essence, expressed through an infinity of attributes. Even Cartesian
physics does not recognise this among its objects of study, though it is
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something upon which many of those objects intimately depend. Thus,
besides the attribute of thought, there seems to be something in Spinoza’s
metaphysics that may not be readily reconciled with physicalism, namely
the infinite essence of God. Again, some scholars have tried to fit this
element into a physicalist framework. Curley, for example, identifies
God’s essence in Spinoza’s system with the laws of nature.14 Physics cer-
tainly seems to recognise laws of nature. Nevertheless, it is unclear that this
interpretation, and others like it, would be enough to save Spinoza for
physicalism. Suppose that Curley is right and the essence of God for
Spinoza does mean the totality of the laws of nature.15 Should we believe
that this totality really is the same as the totality of laws of nature recog-
nised by physics? Does it, for instance, make sense in the context of physics
to suppose (indeed to find it necessary) that this totality is the cause of
itself, or that from the necessity of its nature there must follow everything
which can fall under an infinite intellect?16 I am not sure of the answer to
this question, and so I must concede that perhaps, although this does not
appear to be the most natural reading of his philosophy, Spinoza may
qualify as a physicalist.
All this, however, might be beside the point. The idea that naturalism
is identical with physicalism is highly controversial and has come under
severe criticism.17 If ontological naturalism is distinct from physicalism,
then even if Spinoza turns out to be a physicalist this will not be suffi-
cient to show that his philosophy has any relevance to contemporary
naturalism.
A weaker form of ontological naturalism might be proposed, in which
nothing is held to exist besides the entities recognized by physics and by
other natural sciences. But this opens a number of problematic ques-
tions. How do we decide what counts as a natural science? When should
we say that a natural science has recognized an entity? Did pre-
molecular biology recognize the existence of genes as units of heredity
and selection before they were located in DNA? When the possibility
remains that an entity posited by a special science might be one day
reduced to entities recognized by a more fundamental science, what
ontological conclusions should naturalism lead us to draw? Despairing
of arriving at any decisive answers to such questions, Barry Stroud has
proposed that the only sensible use of the term ‘naturalism’ as an onto-
logical thesis amounts to ‘little more than a slogan on a banner raised to
attract the admiration of those who agree that no supernatural agents
are at work in the world’.18 A supernatural agent is, he explains, one
‘that somehow stands outside the familiar natural world and whose
doings cannot be understood as a part of it’.19
This sense of naturalism seems to line up very nicely with Spinoza’s
declared position. Scholars who present Spinoza as a naturalist usually
refer to his belief that human thoughts and actions are subject to the same
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basic laws of nature as those governing non-human things. Della Rocca
explains Spinoza’s naturalism in the following terms:
. . . Spinoza’s own view is one according to which . . . human beings and all else operate
according to the same laws. Such a unification of explanatory principles is the heart of
Spinoza’s naturalism about psychology: human psychology is governed by the same princi-
ples that govern rocks and tables and dogs.20
This certainly expresses something Spinoza believed, and if holding such a
belief is what it means to be a naturalist then Spinoza was undoubtedly a
naturalist. The passage usually cited to exemplify Spinoza’s naturalism in
this sense is the following:
Most of those who have written about the affects, and men’s way of living, seem to treat, not
of natural things, which follow the common laws of Nature, but of things which are outside
Nature. Indeed they seem to conceive man in Nature as a dominion within a dominion. For
they believe that man disturbs, rather than follows, the order of Nature.
. . . But . . . nothing happens in Nature which can be attributed to any defect in it, for Nature
is always the same, and its virtue and power of acting are everywhere one and the same, that
is, the laws and rules of Nature, according to which all things happen, and change from one
form to another, are always and everywhere the same.21
What he meant by ‘the order of nature’ is made clear in a later passage,
which states that ‘the laws and rules of Nature, according to which all
things happen, and change from one form to another, are always and
everywhere the same’.22 On this definition, Spinoza’s God is not super-
natural, since his power is never manifested through violations of the laws
of nature.23 Spinoza’s naturalism might then be defined as a rejection of
supernaturalism, and this rejection might be identified with the assertion
that everything is subject to uniform and universal laws of nature, includ-
ing human actions and mental events. Perhaps, then, this is all that is
meant by contemporary philosophers who take Spinoza’s position to be a
form of naturalism, and this is how, if pressed, they would answer if asked
how his naturalistic philosophy determines his attitude towards theology.
But it is important to observe how few are the commitments of this kind
of naturalism. It does not entail physicalism, since things obeying the
fundamental laws of nature might be non-physical.24 Nor does the propo-
sition that nature’s laws are uniform and universal entail methodological
naturalism, since it does not in itself entail that science is the only or the
best means of discovering the truth about such laws and the things they
govern. And what exactly does ‘standing outside the natural order’ mean?
When a theory posits a new kind of entity, is it permissible for the theory
to also propose a change to the recognized natural order, so as to
accommodate the new member? If not, what should we say of quantum
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mechanics, or gravity in the days of Newtonian physics? If so, what posits
are actually ruled out, and why? Claiming Spinoza as an ontological
naturalist in this sense entails so little that it is difficult to see what use the
claim can be in helping us to understand Spinoza’s philosophy either in
itself or in its relation to contemporary ways of thinking.
Methodological naturalism
I turn, then, to methodological naturalism: the commitment to natural
science as the best or only way to learn the truth about the natural world.
This position is described, sometimes pejoratively, as ‘scientism’.25 As
Wilfrid Sellars puts it (with deference to Protagoras), naturalism of this
kind is the view that ‘science is the measure of all things, of what is that it
is, and of what it is not that it is not’.26 Less aphoristically, Alexander
Rosenberg describes it as:
. . . the conviction that the methods of science are the only reliable ways to secure knowledge
of anything; that science’s description of the world is correct in its fundamentals; and that
when ‘complete,’ what science tells us will not be surprisingly different from what it tells us
today.27
This view implies that philosophy, insofar as it produces genuine knowl-
edge, must be either a species of natural science or a system that does little
more than compare, organize, and draw out the implications of the
various natural sciences.
Of course, sensibly applying this label to any Early Modern thinker
requires one to be liberal about what counts as ‘science’ and what qualifies
as being ‘correct in its fundamentals’. The various bundle of theories and
explanations of natural phenomena produced by Galileo, Boyle,
Descartes, Newton, and others can be classed together as Early Modern
science at best only in a very loose sense.28 And the judgment that the
description of the world given by this bundle of theories is correct in its
fundamentals – insofar as any single general description can be said to be
given by them at all – has no hope of being true unless a great deal of
weight is given to the clause ‘in its fundamentals’. If we trust our own
contemporary science at all we must acknowledge that the world is sur-
prisingly different in any number of important ways from how it appeared
to all Early Modern thinkers.
But even allowing for all of this – allowing, that is, that there is a body
of Early Modern natural science whose description of the world is
correct in its fundamentals – it remains unlikely that Spinoza will end up
counting as a scientistic naturalist. Although it has been suggested that
he presented (to quote a recent textbook) ‘a systematic and coherent
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vision of how the world might look to someone who is willing to
suspend belief in revealed religion and take very seriously the claims of
the newly emerging natural science’,29 it must be noted again that a great
deal of his philosophical conclusions in the Ethics are based on a theory
about the necessary existence and omnipotent nature of God. I do not
think that many people would regard such a theory to be part of the
newly emerging natural science of Spinoza’s age. There is no doubt that
various beliefs about God informed the emerging natural sciences of the
Early Modern period.30 But if we count those beliefs as part of those
sciences then we are placing the activity of rationally reflecting upon the
nature of an infinitely perfect being in the same intellectual category
as empirical physics, anatomy, and astronomy. A category this broad
does not seem to be what naturalists of the scientistic kind mean by
‘science’.
Perhaps, however, the attempt to specify any determinate category of
scientific thinking is anyway doomed to fail. John Dupré argues that there
is no sufficiently unified notion of science to serve as the category required
for defining the scientistic version of naturalism.31 Similarly, Penelope
Maddy emphasizes the failure of philosophers thus far to have made any
successful general analysis of what counts as scientific.32 Both recommend
that naturalists give up on scientism and simply dedicate themselves to
recognizing the success of, as Dupré puts it, ‘projects that can be directed
toward the investigation of the natural world . . . in terms of familiar
epistemic virtues such as understanding, explanation, prediction, and
control’.33
Nevertheless, even in accepting Dupré’s pluralism about science we
must remain implicitly committed to at least some of the familiar con-
straints adhered to in demarcating scientific from non-scientific methods.
After all, it would be an enormous cosmic coincidence if a group of
investigative projects having nothing in common methodologically were
all able to attain to the same epistemic virtues. I propose that what they
have in common is empiricism. Dupré might resist using the category of
empiricism for the same reason he resists using the category of science,
namely the lack of any definite criterion for including any given project or
method within it. Nevertheless, he would be denying plain facts if he were
to resile entirely from the conclusion that those natural sciences whose
success is most readily recognized have in common the commitment to
testing and modifying their theories, as Rosenberg puts it, ‘by observation,
by experiment, by experience, by some sort of sensory awareness of hap-
penings that are in one way or another not under our cognitive control’.34
Precisely how deferential one must be to such awareness in shaping one’s
theories in order for it to be rightly said that one is subjecting one’s
theories to empirical testing is a question to which a determinate answer
has been notoriously lacking in the philosophy of science. Nevertheless, I
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take it as a consensus view among the informed that, in Peter Godfrey-
Smith’s words:
Science works by taking theoretical ideas and trying to find ways to expose them to observa-
tion. The scientific strategy is to construe ideas, to embed them in surrounding conceptual
frameworks, and to develop them, in such a way that this exposure is possible even in the case
of the most general and ambitious hypotheses about the universe.35
In other words, the stipulation that all and only scientific projects pursue
empirical methods is not so vulnerable to the looseness of its key terms as
to be inapplicable as a general rule of demarcation. Despite Dupré’s
concerns, Antonia Lolordo is right to note that ‘the naturalist claim that
philosophy is continuous with science is . . . the claim that philosophy has
no special methods distinct from the empirical methods of science’.36
I shall therefore, throughout this article, regard methodological natu-
ralism as the view that all reliable knowledge about the world of concrete
objects is empirical, meaning it is found through taking theoretical ideas
and trying to expose them to observation. Two qualifications are impor-
tant. First, methodological naturalism on this definition makes no pro-
nouncements on how knowledge of non-concrete objects is to be had.37
While this inevitably introduces ambiguities into the position, since the
concrete/non-concrete distinction is not always clear, it seems nevertheless
prudent. A naturalism that, for example, required all mathematical theo-
ries to be exposed to observation before counting as knowledge would be
unnecessarily bold.
Next, this kind of naturalism allows that scientists may have to work for
a long time at developing ideas and embedding them in the relevant
conceptual frameworks before the opportunity for observational exposure
presents itself. Therefore, areas of proposed knowledge of the concrete
world that appear to be purely abstract or conceptual need not be rejected
outright by this form of naturalism. Purely conceptual work may be a
necessary stage in the process of eventually exposing ideas to observation,
and there are unlikely to be any determinate rules about how long it may
need to go on. Thus, for example, various Early Modern systems of
rational mechanics, based largely on a priori ideas, can be accepted as
naturalistic to the extent that they laid important conceptual groundwork
for later empirical theories.38 Indeed, parts of modern cosmology, theo-
retical physics, and perhaps economics have this status today.
Both qualifications mean that it will inevitably be somewhat indetermi-
nate whether or not a given position is naturalistic. But identifying meth-
odological naturalism with this weak and qualified empiricism seems to be
the happy medium between having an implausibly restrictive definition of
natural science on one side and denying (with equal implausibility) that
there is anything common to the methods of the various sciences, despite
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their sharing in the same epistemic virtues, on the other. Having accepted
this characterization of methodological naturalism, one might be able to
reply to the above refusal to accept Spinoza as a naturalist. The centrality
of God to his philosophy, this reply would go, will not count as anti-
naturalistic if his preferred methods for finding out the truth about God
were sufficiently empirical. Since Spinoza identified God with nature, and
since many thinkers from his time used generally empirical methods for
finding out about nature, the possibility of such an interpretation presents
itself.39 According to Daniel Dennett, for example (an expert, though not
on Spinoza, perhaps on naturalism), the identification of God and nature
allowed Spinoza to claim ‘that scientific research was the true path of
theology’.40 The relevant question is, then, whether Spinoza’s methods for
finding out about God/nature were sufficiently empirical for him to count
as a methodological naturalist.
The identification of God with nature, also known as φυ´σις, allows for
the possibility that the methods of empirical physics are also those of
theology. But while many regarded empiricism as the appropriate meth-
odology of physics, was Spinoza among them? Lolordo points out that
Early Modern thinkers often identified metaphysics with physics:
. . . not because their metaphysics [was] empirical, but because their physics allow[ed] for a
priori speculation. (Think, for instance, of the arguments Descartes [formed] to establish that
a vacuum is impossible.)41
Thus, even if we suppose Spinoza to have unified physics and theology, by
identifying God and nature, it remains an open question whether he
allowed empiricism, even of the weak sort defined above, to be the appro-
priate methodology for this unified science.
There is considerable room for debate about how committed Spinoza
was to empiricism, as a variety of articles have shown.42 Spinoza seems to
have endorsed empiricism for studying nature in the Tractatus Theologico-
Politicus: ‘the method for interpreting nature consists above all in forming
a history of nature, from which, as from certain data, we derive the
definitions of natural things’.43 Moreover, as David Savan demonstrates,
Spinoza was an empiricist ‘[i]n his most successful and important scientific
work’.44
Nevertheless, many have cast doubt on Spinoza’s claim to qualify as an
empiricist. One of the most recent and thorough discussions is in an article
by Eric Schliesser. Among Schliesser’s various arguments against the inter-
pretation of Spinoza as ‘a fellow-travelling mechanical philosopher and
proto-scientific naturalist’,45 the following are relevant here.
First, Schliesser points out that, according to Spinoza, ‘one cannot
deduce particular facts from the laws of motion’.46 Since presumably all we
observe are particular facts, if we cannot deduce implications involving
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particular facts from the laws of motion, it is hard to see how our knowl-
edge of such laws could ever be exposed to observation. Yet since motion
appears to be part of the concrete world, methodological naturalism pre-
sumably requires knowledge of the laws of motion to be (at least eventu-
ally) exposable to observation. On the other hand, as many Newtonian
critics of Spinoza pointed out, Spinoza’s theory of motion is strange and
probably inconsistent.47 Odd as it sounds, it is possible to understand
Spinoza’s ‘infinite mode’ of ‘motion and rest’ as something very different
from the kinetic phenomenon we observe in the concrete world – some-
thing abstract rather than concrete.48 And thus it may be possible to mount
an argument that knowledge of the laws of motion, in Spinoza’s sense,
does not constitute knowledge of the concrete world, and thus his
anti-empirical attitude towards them does not constitute a violation of
naturalism.
Next, Schliesser notes that Spinoza was sceptical about the use of math-
ematics and measurement in the study of nature, which he regarded as
piecemeal and relative to the imagination.49 Nothing in my definition of
methodological naturalism requires the naturalist to hold any particular
attitude towards the use of measurement. Nevertheless, since measure-
ment has proven indispensible in allowing scientists to expose their ideas
to observation, Spinoza’s rejection of it implies that if he was a naturalist
at all, he was a naturalist of a highly idiosyncratic kind.
Finally, Schliesser reminds us that Spinoza recommended that we
pursue knowledge of things through their essences, while he was clear that
experience cannot teach us anything about the essences of things.50 If
knowledge of essences counts as knowledge of the concrete world, then
this must constitute a violation of naturalism. The fact that Spinoza calls
a thing’s conatus its ‘actual essence’, and draws any number of behavioural
conclusions about the actions of (concrete) human beings from facts about
the human conatus provides some prima facie evidence that Spinozistic
essences are an active and important part of the concrete world, though
there is of course much more to be said about this.51 This is, then, another
serious challenge to the interpretation of Spinoza as a methodological
naturalist. Schliesser also shows that, in contrast with knowledge of things
through their essences, Spinoza does not hold high hopes for the knowl-
edge of the natural world that must come from experience.52 This does not
constitute a violation of naturalism, however, since one may consistently
hold that the most reliable knowledge we can hope to have of the concrete
world is empirical in character while admitting that this knowledge is
nevertheless very incomplete and unreliable by some absolute standard.
The points that Schliesser raises fail to provide decisive grounds for
rejecting Spinoza as a methodological naturalist. Too much depends upon
how Spinoza’s various metaphysical positions are interpreted. Given the
complexity of the latter, this is probably inevitable. In what follows I also
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do not provide decisive grounds for rejecting the naturalist interpretation
of Spinoza. What I propose is that examining the way in which Spinoza
positioned himself with respect to other philosophers in his immediate
environment tells us something important about his relation to what we
call naturalism. While other philosophers who, like him, developed the
work of Descartes built a system that was at least amenable to methodo-
logical naturalism, Spinoza, we shall see, went determinedly in the
opposite direction.
God and a priori knowledge
In 1651, Count Louis Henry of Nassau requested the Dutch universities to
give him their opinions of Descartes’ philosophy.53 The universities offered
various responses, but the one from Harderwijk University represents the
median position. It was, in Paul Dibon’s words, ‘full of respect for
[Descartes] the mathematician, tolerant of the physician, irreconcilable to
the metaphysician’.54 The authors of the Hardewijk letter informed the
Count that: ‘as for [Cartesian] metaphysics, the best people judge it to be
a pest to theology and so they condemn it and consider it worthy of
suppression’.55
One thing that made Descartes’ metaphysics particularly problematic
for traditional theology was that Descartes had made at least one major
break with traditional Scholastic metaphysics in his concept of God.
Whereas tradition held that God was ‘self-caused’ only in a negative sense
that really amounted to his having no cause, Descartes held that God was
the cause of himself in a positive sense. An effect of this change was to
allow for God’s existence to be proven a priori rather than a posteriori.
These terms did not quite mean in the Early Modern period what they
mean today. An a priori proof was one that reasoned from cause to effect,
while an a posteriori proof was one that reasoned from effect to cause. In
the case of proofs of God’s existence, an a priori proof would prove his
existence from his cause, whereas an a posteriori proof would prove it from
his effects. The distinction was made in its decisive form by St Thomas, as
the distinction between a demonstratio propter quid (that is, a priori) and a
demonstratio quia (that is, a posteriori):
Demonstration is of two kinds. One is by the cause, and is called propter quid, and this is by
what is prior simpliciter. The other is by the effect, and is called a demonstration quia, and this
is by those things that are prior for us, as when some effect of something is more manifest to
us than its cause and we proceed by the effect to knowledge of the cause.56
St Thomas did not even consider the possibility of an a priori proof of
God’s existence, since God was generally held to have no cause.57
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Descartes, in presenting God as the cause of himself rather than an
uncaused being, opened the possibility of an a priori proof of his exist-
ence.58
Although this seems an abstract and technical matter, it was of enor-
mous significance for the religious authorities in the Dutch Republic. If
God has no cause but is the cause of other things then we can only reason
about him a posteriori. This accords with Reformed doctrine, whereby, as
for instance ‘The Belgic Confession’ expresses it, God is meant to be
known by his effects:
. . . by the creation, preservation, and government of the universe, since that universe is
before our eyes like a beautiful book in which all creatures, great and small, are as letters to
make us ponder the invisible things of God: his eternal power and his divinity, as the apostle
Paul says in Romans 1:20, and more openly by his holy and divine Word, as much as we need
in this life, for his glory and for the salvation of his own.59
Note that this effectively asks that our ideas of God be, in Godfrey-
Smith’s terms, exposed to observation, namely to what is observed in
Scripture and in the book of nature. An a priori proof, by contrast,
requires one to begin with direct knowledge of God; it reaches its conclu-
sion by beginning from knowledge of God as a cause and inferring some-
thing about God as an effect. Such a proof implies that God as a cause can
be directly known prior to his effects. This goes against Reformed doc-
trine. It also (unless one believes that God can be directly observed)
implies that non-empirical knowledge of God is possible.
Perhaps because he saw its implications, Descartes did not make explicit
the apparent a priori character of his proof. Yet it is revealed through his
debate with the Dutch theologian and neo-Scholastic philosopher
Johannes Caterus. Caterus responded to a passage in the Meditations in
which Descartes had implied that if a thing is caused by itself it must in fact
be a being possessing every perfection; that is, God.60 Caterus asked why
this must be so, and guessed that Descartes may have had the following
argument from Suarez in mind:
Every limitation proceeds from some cause; therefore if something is limited and finite this is
because its cause was either unable or unwilling to endow it with more greatness or perfec-
tion; and hence if something derives its existence from itself, and not from some cause [si ergo
aliquid a se est, & non a causâ] it is indeed unlimited and infinite.61
For reasons irrelevant to this article, Caterus found this a bad argument.
But the phrase I have emphasized shows that Caterus interpreted
Descartes’ claim that God is the cause of himself as meaning that really
God lacks a cause; he has his existence ‘from himself’ rather than ‘from
some cause’. Indeed, Caterus noted, to say that a being is caused by itself
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can mean either that the being is the reason for its own existence, or that
its existence has no cause outside of itself, which is to say that really it is an
uncaused being.62 The latter, Caterus claimed, is ‘the way in which every-
one takes the phrase’.63
In the course of answering Caterus’ objections, Descartes denied this. If
a thing has no cause for its existence, he insisted, then it must be the cause
of itself not in the merely negative sense of being uncaused but rather in
some positive sense.64 Caterus had interpreted Descartes wrongly when he
assumed that by ‘self-caused’ he meant only ‘uncaused’, as ‘everyone takes
the phrase’. As Étienne Gilson points out, although Caterus’ way of
interpreting ‘self-caused’ was standard in the Scholastic context, ‘the pecu-
liarity of the Cartesian position is to admit that God, precisely because he
is infinite, in some way behaves towards himself in the manner of a
cause’.65 Descartes had in fact reasoned from God-as-a-cause’s ‘supera-
bundance of power [exuperantiam potestatis]’ to God-as-an-effect’s neces-
sary existence.66 Nothing can stop God’s superabundant power from
causing his own existence; thus he exists necessarily. Whether this proof
was properly a priori or not is perhaps disputable. But Descartes certainly
opened the possibility of an a priori proof by changing the conception of
God from that of an uncaused being to that of a self-caused being, for the
reason that one obviously cannot reason from the cause of an uncaused
thing, whereas this is not the case for a self-caused thing. As we shall see,
Spinoza took this possibility up in earnest.
Because of the apparent threat to traditional theology, most Cartesian
professors in the Dutch universities tried their best to play down the
importance of metaphysics in the Cartesian system. For example, the
Cartesian professor of physics at Leiden, Johannes De Raey, ‘entirely
dispense[d] with Descartes’ metaphysics. He [did] not mention systematic
doubt, or the cogito, nor [did] he attempt to prove the existence of God’.67
Yet Descartes’ metaphysics seems to have played a crucial role in justify-
ing his philosophical method.68 God’s necessary existence was meant to
guarantee the truth of our clear and distinct ideas, such as are used in
philosophy.69 In fact, Descartes had stated unambiguously that ‘all the
treasures of wisdom and the sciences lie hidden . . . in the true God’.70
Besides this, Cartesian physics – the part of Cartesian philosophy that
professors like De Raey hoped to promote – drew upon elements of
Cartesian metaphysics, especially some of his thoughts about God.71
Descartes famously suggested that metaphysics was the root of the tree of
philosophy (of which physics was the trunk).72 Perhaps De Raey hoped
that the foundations Descartes sought to provide with his metaphysics
could also be provided by orthodox theology, or at least by a system of
metaphysics less prone to conflict with orthodoxy.
Effectively, however, De Raey’s position left Cartesian physics without
any metaphysical foundation. It is worth noting that while Descartes had
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intended his physics to be published after the Meditations,73 in the Dutch
context Henricus Regius had ruined this plan by publishing several dispu-
tations on Cartesian physics in 1640–1.74 The idea that Cartesian physics
was somehow independently justified, rather than grounded in metaphys-
ics, was perhaps more natural in the Dutch universities than elsewhere for
this reason. But it presents a puzzle. De Raey believed that physics, as part
of philosophy, depended only on the ideas of the intellect and not on the
senses. Natural philosophy ‘is, and should be, absolute and intrinsic, and
known solely by the intellect’.75 He distinguished between observation-
based ‘natural history’ and the ‘true science’ of nature, ‘by which we can
have knowledge of hidden things according to the intellect’.76 The puzzle is
why we should trust that our intellect represents things as they truly are in
the world.77
For Descartes, the answer appeared to involve God. While clear and
distinct ideas can perhaps be known to be true without knowledge of God,
knowing their applicability to the concrete world seems to depend on the
latter.78 But this again suggests that we must have true knowledge of God
before we have knowledge of nature, as indeed the third Meditation
claimed: ‘I must examine whether there is a God, and, if there is, whether
he can be a deceiver. For if I do not know this, it seems that I can never be
quite certain about anything else’.79 Again this introduces the heretical
suggestion that God can be known directly rather than through his effects.
Yet De Raey and his fellow Cartesians had argued, largely for political
reasons, that philosophy and theology (the latter included all knowledge
of God) are utterly independent of each other.80 For him, the less con-
nected philosophy is to theology, ‘the more excellent and true it is’.81
Knowledge of God and his non-deceiving character cannot be used to
guarantee ideas of the intellect used in physics. A disputation defended
under De Raey in 1668, argued that physics should be regarded as ‘the
science of the visible world, for the task of physics is none other than the
explanation of the sensible world through intelligible causes’.82 But neither
De Raey nor the disputant explained what could justify the application of
intelligible causes to the sensible world if not the guarantee of applicability
delivered by God.
A system of physics that claims no explicit justification for its key ideas
at all must appear inferior to one that claims its justification in observed
data. This appears to be at least one of the reasons why Cartesian physics
gave way to empirically-based – mostly Newtonian – systems in the Dutch
Republic earlier than anywhere else.83 Theo Verbeek argues that the spe-
cific version of Cartesian physics proposed by De Raey and his associates
prepared the ground for the early acceptance of Netwonian physics in
Leiden.84 In the 18th century, Pieter van Musschenbroek, one of these
early followers of Newton, denied that we have any ‘innate ideas either of
bodies or of their properties or of their actions on one another’. Instead, he
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argued, ‘we must investigate and learn everything by experiment and
observations, and then form ideas of it for ourselves’.85 It is hard to see
how a Cartesian could defend the application of innate intellectual ideas to
sensible data in the face of this attack, without resorting to Descartes’
metaphysical notions. Thus by cutting off Cartesian physics from its meta-
physical roots, Dutch Cartesians like De Raey allowed it to be easily
washed away in the rising tide of empiricism.
Spinoza, by contrast, emphasised precisely the elements in Cartesian
philosophy that the Dutch Cartesians wanted to play down. To his pres-
entation of Cartesian philosophy, published in 1663, he appended a set of
Metaphysical Thoughts, which made Cartesianism into a novel system of
metaphysics containing several radical theological ideas.86 In the Short
Treatise, he laid great emphasis on the availability of an a priori proof for
the existence of God due to the Cartesian idea of God as a self-caused
rather than uncaused being:
. . . we can prove both a priori and a posteriori that God exists. Better, indeed, a priori. For
things which are proved in the latter way [a posteriori] must be proved through their external
causes, which is a manifest imperfection in them, inasmuch as they cannot make themselves
known through themselves, but only through external causes. God, however, who is the first
cause of all things, and also the cause of himself [causa sui], makes himself known through
himself. Hence one need not attach much importance to the saying of Thomas Aquinas,
namely, that God could not be proved a priori because he forsooth has no cause.87
We have seen that proving God’s existence a priori implies that we can
know him directly, rather than through his observable effects. Moreover,
it is very unlikely that even Spinoza’s God-as-nature can be known by
direct observation. Surely we have no sensory experience of nature as a
whole, or in itself, independently of our sensory experiences of particular
natural things. 88 In fact Spinoza even rejected the standard view that God
could be known through his effects: in the Short Treatise, he argued that
‘[i]t is impossible to get to know God through something else’.89 He thus
fully embraced the kind of innate, non-empirical knowledge of God that
De Raey wanted to purge from Cartesianism.
Yet we have seen that it was precisely this purge that made De Raey’s
version of Cartesianism vulnerable to empiricist critiques by Newtonians
and others. Without Descartes’ metaphysical foundations, it was left with
no way of justifying its dependence on innate ideas.90 Spinoza held onto
the foundations, thus sustaining an alternative to empiricism unavailable
to De Raey. This is not to say that Spinoza’s system was not also open to
criticisms by the new Newtonian empiricists when they arrived.91 The
claim is not that he provided a wholly successful alternative to empiricism;
it is that, unlike De Raey, he held onto the metaphysical foundations that
could have provided the only grounding for such an alternative. He seems
therefore to be a very bad candidate for the title of methodological
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naturalist. De Raey and other Cartesians could be regarded as proto-
naturalists to the extent that they left no space for non-empiricist meta-
physical standards of justification in physics, in effect leaving room for the
development of empiricist standards. The same cannot be said of Spinoza.
Conclusion
The claim that Spinoza was an ontological naturalist, we have seen, is false
unless the term is drained of all useful content. The claim that he was
a methodological naturalist, we now see, is, if not false, then at least
extremely misleading with respect to his historical position. As a tolerable
simplification, I recommend we say that he was not a naturalist.
Alexander Douglas
Institute of Philosophy and King’s College, London
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